THE NONPROFIT HOSPITAL EXEMPTION OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT:
APPLICATION TO THE UNIVERSITYOPERATED HOSPITAL IN DUKE UNIVERSITY
In Duke University' the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) faced squarely for the first time the proper application of

the nonprofit hospital exemption of section 2(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 in the context of a nonprofit, non-

hospital employer operating a medical center and hospital as part of
a large university. The Board easily found a basis for jurisdiction over

Duke University and its medical center, both of which are intimately
connected with Duke Hospital and with one another. Nevertheless,
the Board excluded from its jurisdiction all employees who regularly

spend over 50 percent of their working time in the Hospital itself. On
the other hand, in the sole dissent to the four-member 3 en banc

decision, Member Fanning focused in detail on the meaning of the
"hospital exemption" and concluded that, in light of its legislative

history, the exemption was not meant to apply to a universityoperated hospital such as Duke Hospital.

While both the majority and dissenting opinions have historical
and logical support, both opinions adopted a superficial approach. In
the majority opinion, the reader is asked to accept, almost by fiat,

the over-simplified reasoning that since Duke Hospital "is a nonprofit hospital operated by a nonprofit university, it appears that,
literally, the exclusion . . .applies to it."' Since, as will be demon1. 194 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 78 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1971). In Loyola University Medical Center,
194 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 78 L.R.R.M. 1551 (1971) (decided the same day), the Board dismissed
a petition for a bargaining unit of seven electrical maintenance employees who were university
employees but who spent over half their time working in a nonprofit hospital operated by
Loyola University.
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Kochery & Straus, The Nonprofit Hospitaland the Union, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 255 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Kochery & Straus].
Sherman & Black, The Labor Board and the Private Nonprofit Employer: A Critical
Examination of the Board's Worthy Cause Exemption, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1323 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Sherman & Black].
2. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
3. The vacancy created by Chairman McCulloch's resignation had not yet been filled.
4. 194 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1549.
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strated in this Note, that conclusion is not nearly so clear-cut, a more

comprehensive and analytical approach was to have been expected.
This Note will consider the university hospital jurisdictional question
against the background of the legislative and judicial history of the
section 2(2) exemption with a view toward suggesting the proper
application of that exemption.
BACKGROUND OF THE

Duke University CASE

On November 18, 1970, Local 1199D of the National Union of
Hospital and Nursing Home Employees5 filed a representation petition with the eleventh regional office of the National Labor Relations
Board, seeking designation as a bargaining unit of "all of the service
and maintenance employees at Duke University Medical Center, a

medical teaching center of Duke University." 6 On the same date the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees7
petitioned for designation as a bargaining unit of service employees
of Duke University in its non-medical facilities. 8 At the ensuing representation hearing,9 Duke University contended that the appropriate

bargaining unit was a combined single unit of hospital and campus
employees.'" While the two petitioners maintained their positions favoring separate units for hospital and campus employees, each intervened in the petition of the other, and both expressed a desire to be
5. The union's full name, as it appeared on the petition, was National Union of Hospital
and Nursing Home Employees, RWDSU, AFL-CIO, Local i199D. 194 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 78
L.R.R.M. at 1547.
6. Id. (Case No. I -RC-3234). The petition excluded all technical, clerical and professional
employees, licensed practical nurses, registered nurses, security officers (guards), administrative
employees and supervisory employees within the meaning of the Act. This petition was administratively dismissed by the Regional Director for the Eleventh Region (possibly for insufficient
showing of interest). Local 1199D refiled its petition on December 18, 1970. Case No. 1I-RC3251.
7. This petitioner was also an AFL-CIO affiliate. 194 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 78 L.R.R.M. at
1547.
8. Id. (Case No. I I-RC-3234). The proposed unit included all cafeteria employees, dining
hall employees, maids, housekeepers, janitors, ground crew, utility helpers, counter employees,
campus dope shop employees employed at the employer's campus, but excluded skilled and
semi-skilled maintenance employees, professional employees, technical employees, office clerical employees, supervisors and guards as defined in the Act.
9. The cases were consolidated for hearing, which was held in Durham, North Carolina,
on January 19, 20, 21 and 22, and on February 3 and 4, 1971.
10. 194 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1547. The estimated number of employees in
each separate bargaining unit is approximately 1250, the broad unit containing something over
2500.
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on the ballot for any unit eventually found to be appropriate." Be-

cause of the novel and important nature of the jurisdictional question
raised under section 2(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, the

Regional Director transferred the cases to the Board for decision. 12
An important question requiring both statutory construction and an

exercise of discretion faced the Board: was the section 2(2) nonprofit
hospital exemption meant to apply, or did it apply, to the set of

circumstances present in Duke? An appropriate starting point, yet
one not considered in the majority opinion, is the legislative history
of the exemption.
3
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The original Wagner Act of 193511 did not provide any exemption

for nonprofit employers.' 5 H.R. 3020, a House bill introduced in
1947, however, contained a broad exemption for nonprofit employers

in its proposed section 2(2). 11 Only a few references to nonprofit
I1. Id. Local 1199D amended its petition at the hearing to describe the bargaining unit as
follows:
Service employees at Duke Hospital, including its satellites, Duke Pavilion, the Rehabilitation Center, and Child Guidance Center, the storeroom, located in the Anlyan Duke
Medical Services Building 6; and including also, clinical assistants in the Medical Diagnostic Clinic; housekeepers and porters, and messengers in Community Health Services;
lab assistants in the Department of Surgery; housekeepers and lab assistants in the
Department of Anesthesiology; lab assistants in the Department of Pathology; lab assistants in the Department of Pediatrics; orderlies in the Department of Ophthamology;
housekeepers, porters and lab assistants in the Department of Micro-Biology and Immunology; animal caretakers in the Department of Anatomy; housekeepers, lab assistants
and the head Clerk in the Department of Medicine; housekeepers in the Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology; and animal caretakers in the Department of Veterinarian
Medicine. Id., 78 L.R.R.M. at 1547 n.3.
After the Board's decision in Duke University, Local 1199D requested that its name not
be included on the ballot submitted to the unit of campus employees.
12. Regional Directors are authorized to transfer representation cases to the Board for
decision. 29 C.F.R. § 101.21(a) (1971).
13. See generally Kochery & Straus 256-59; Sherman & Black 1328-37.
14. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449.
15. The relevant portion of section 2 of the Wagner Act of 1935 read as follows:
The term "employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly
or indirectly, but shall not include the United States, or any State or political subdivision
thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time,
or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in
the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization. Id. § 2(2).
16. The relevant portion of the House bill stated:
The term "employer" . . . shall not include . . . any corporation, community chest,
fund, or foundation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable. scien-
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employers in general were made in the hearings before the House
Committee on Education and Labor in February of 1947.11 The chairman of the Board did not discuss the issue in his remarks at the
hearings.' The House committee, in its report accompanying the bill,
commented on the exemption as follows:
Churches, hospitals, schools, colleges, and societies for the care of the needy
are not engaged in "commerce" and certainly not in interstate commerce.
These institutions frequently assist local governments in carrying out their
essential functions, and for this reason should be subject to exclusive local
jurisdiction. The bill therefore excludes from the definition of "employer"
institutions that qualify as charities under our tax laws."

At the hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, representatives of two influential interest groups offered

testimony in favor of an exemption. The American Red Cross appealed for exclusion from the definition of jurisdictional employer on
the basis of the organization's charitable nature, federal charter, and
its need to pursue its work without danger of interruption by labor

strife. 2 Furthermore, the president of the American Hospital Association requested exemption of hospital employees from the coverage
2
of the Act.2 ' Notwithstanding the testimony favoring an exemption,
the bill was reported out of committee devoid of any exclusion for
nonprofit employers, and the report accompanying the bill was silent

on this issue.2The Hospital Association lobby, however, was apparently far
from ineffective. Senator Tydings offered the amendment exempting
nonprofit hospitals, which was eventually incorporated into the
NLRA, stating:
tific, literary or educational purposes, or the prevention of cruelty to children or animals,
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, and no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. H.R. 3020, reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1947).
17. See Hearings on Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act Before the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 742-62, 2700, 2906-07 (1947).
18. Id. at 3163-70. See Sherman & Black 1329.
19. H.R. RaP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1947).
20. Hearings on Labor Relations Program Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 2057-58 (1947).
21. Id. at 2181-84.
22. Id. The labor unions naturally took a position against an exemption. Urging NLRA
coverage, the president of the United Office and Professional Workers of America argued that
those of its members who were employed by social welfare agencies were badly in need of the
protections of the Act. Id. at 2260-61.
23. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 31 (1947).
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Mr. President, this amendment is designed merely to help a great number of
hospitals which are having very difficult times. They are eleemosynary institutions; no profit is involved in their operations, and I understand from the
Hospital Association that this amendment would be very helpful in their efforts to serve those who have not the means to pay for hospital service, enable
them to keep the doors open and operate the hospitals. Employees of such a
hospital should not have to come to the National Labor Relations Board. A
charitable institution is way beyond the scope of labor-management relations
in which profit is involved ....
11

Senator Taft, the sponsor of the Senate bill, made only one short

statement on the subject, indicating his feeling that the Tydings
amendment was wholly unnecessary because an identical result would

obtain without it through Board discretion2 Nevertheless, the
amended bill passed the Senate on May 13.
Three weeks later, in recommending adoption of the Senate ver-

sion of section 2(2), the House conferees rejected the House's broad
exemption for all charitable organizations."

The Conference

Committee's expressed reason for the change-that the Board had
rarely taken jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations, and then only

when their activities were commercial in nature-gave the
Conference Report special significance in the Board's determination

of its own post-1947 policies.2 The amended bill as reported by the
House conferees was passed twice by both the House and Senate-once early in June to enact the measure, and once later the same

month to override President Truman's veto.
Commentators have suggested with considerable persuasiveness

that the statement in the report of the House conferees as to the

Board's policy toward charitable organizations prior to 194728 is of

dubious credibility. 29 Specifically, improper reliance seems to have
24. 93 CONG. REc. 4997 (1947).
25. The committee considered this amendment, but did not act on it, because it was
felt it was unnecessary. The committee felt that hospitals were not engaged in interstate
commerce, and that their business should not be so construed. We rather felt it would
open up the question of making further exemptions. Id. (remarks of Senator Taft).
26. H. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947).
27. The relevant portion of the Conference Report read as follows:
The other nonprofit organizations excluded under the House bill are not specifically
excluded in the conference agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances and in
connection with purely commercial activities of such organizations have any of the
activities of such organizations or of their employees been considered as affecting commerce so as to bring them within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act. Id.
See notes 49-50 infra and accompanying text.
28. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Sherman & Black 1331-34.
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been placed on the Board's refusal to assert jurisdiction over a nonprofit employer shortly before the bill was introduced." In fact, the
Board had earlier held that hospital activities were "commercial" and
stated that the "commerce clause looks to the activities which are
carried on, rather than to motives."'" Thus, to fully appreciate the
meaning of the section 2(2) exemption, consideration of the early
decisions of the Board and the courts will be instructive, if not essential.
THE EARLY JUDICIAL HISTORY

As early as 1937 the Supreme Court in Associated Press v.
NLRB 32 held that an employer's nonprofit status does not exempt
that employer from coverage under the NLRA. The Court's decision
rested heavily on the fact that the particular employer was formed
by, and served, several profit-making newspapers and that the employer extensively used interstate and foreign channels of communication. Two years later the Board asserted jurisdiction over a nonprofit employer publishing religious and medical literature. 3 Without discussing the commercial nature of the enterprise itself, the
opinion focused on the corporation's close relation to interstate commerce and its susceptibility to labor disputes tending to disrupt commerce. Furthermore, in 1942 the Board asserted jurisdiction over the
employees of the American Medical Association. 4 After noting that
the Association was a nonprofit scientific and educational organization, the Board concluded that its publishing activities affected interstate commerce with sufficient force to require coverage by the Act.
Later the same year, the Board in Polish National Alliance35 hinted

of a "commerciality" test to be used in dealing with nonprofit employers who otherwise were engaged in interstate commerce. The test
focused on the economic effects of the employer's operation rather
than the employer's motives. As a nonprofit fraternal benefit corpo30. Hyde Park Cooperative Soc'y, 73 N.L.R.B. 1254 (1947). See text accompanying notes
44-45 supra.

31. Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 44 N.L.R.B. 533, 540 (1942). See notes 3738 infra and accompanying text.
32. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
33. Christian Bd. of Publication, 13 N.L.R.B. 534 (1939), enforced 113 F.2d 678 (8th Cir.
1940).
34. American Medical Ass'n, 39 N.L.R.B. 385 (1942).
35. 42 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1380 (1942), enforced as modified, 136 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1943),
aff'd, 322 U.S. 643 (1944). Accord, Ass'n Canado-Americaine, 72 N.L.R.B. 520 (1947).
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ration, the Alliance was engaged in a large interstate insurance business for its members. Without discussion, the Board looked past the

nonprofit motives to the commercial nature of the enterprise as an
overriding consideration. The commerciality test became the stan36
dard for almost a decade.

Even though the Board gave a full discussion to the relevance of

an employer's nonprofit status two months later in Central Dispensary & Emergency Hospital,7 its opinion adhered to the commer-

ciality factor as determinative. Despite arguments that the hospital's
nonprofit status should make it exempt from NLRB jurisdiction, the
Board stressed the dominating importance of activities over mo-

tives-a fact either overlooked or ignored by the House conferees five
years later. 38 Between the decision in Central Dispensary and the

passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, the Board asserted
jurisdiction in five out of six cases involving nonprofit employers. For
example, a corporation operating a cooperative apartment, the shareholders of which were the apartment owners, was found to engage in
sufficient commercial activities to be in interstate commerce. 39 In

another case, a nonprofit employer operating a restaurant for employees of the Department of Agriculture was found to be within the

category of "employer" because its activities affected commerce. 0
Jurisdiction was also asserted over a nonprofit trade school," a non-

profit retail distributor of electricity,42 and a nonprofit fraternal benefit society.43 In each instance, the motives of the employer were
36. See Sherman & Black 1331-34.
37. 44 N.L.R.B. 533 (1942). The Board concluded that "[tihe general nature of hospital
business is . . . within the meaning of trade or commerce." Id. at 539. It is interesting to note
that hospitals, the setting for the Board's strongest pre-1947 statement of its policy of asserting
jurisdiction over nonprofit employers who were engaged in commerce, were the only nonprofit
employers excluded from coverage by the Taft-Hartley amendments. See also Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 50 N.L.R.B. 393 (1943), enforced 145 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945) (bargaining order).
38. 44 N.L.R.B. at 540. See notes 27, 30-31 supra and accompanying text. The Board also
dealt with the hospital's argument that it should not be subject to the Act because it is a
charitable institution. The answer given, as valid today as it was then, was that Congress did
not intend to exempt charities from the scope of the Act's coverage. Id. at 540-42.
39. Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 587 (1942).
40. Welfare Ass'n of Dep't of Agriculture, 45 N.L.R.B. 285 (1942).
41. Henry Ford Trade School, 58 N.L.R.B. 1535 (1944) (company-funded trade school
whose students studied skills needed in the auto industry and repaired tools for the company).
42. Gibson County Elec. Membership Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 760 (1946).
43. Ass'n Canado-Americaine, 72 N.L.R.B. 52 (1947) (organization of French Catholics
having an insurance program similar to that in Polish NationalAlliance, supra note 35).
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ignored once the Board found that the activities which placed the
employer in interstate commerce were typically commercial. The
only case involving a nonprofit employer in which jurisdiction was
not asserted by the Board during the above period was Hyde Park
Cooperative Society." However, the Board's decision in that case to
dismiss the employer petition of a non-stock retail cooperative was
based on a finding that its activities did not affect interstate commerce, not on the fact that the motive behind those "local" activities
was other than profit-making. While the case has never been cited by
the Board as an example of the Board's refusal to assert jurisdiction
over nonprofit employers, it was given heavy weight by the House
conferees when drafting their report.4"
The prevailing approach taken by the Board in asserting jurisdiction over employers at the time of enactment of the 1947 section 2(2)
exemption emphasized the "commerciality" of activities and transactions rather than the presence or absence of nonprofit motives. In
indicating that the Board had rarely asserted jurisdiction over em• ployers who displayed nonprofit purposes, therefore, the legislators
of the nonprofit hospital exemption had attributed the Board with a
policy which was directly opposite the policy it had actually followed.
FORMATION OF A WORTHY CAUSE EXEMPTION

In the four years following the passage of the Taft-Hartley
amendments, the Board continued to assert jurisdiction over nonprofit employers. For example, the Board applied the NLRA to an
educational institution and two research foundations connected with
it, although the organizations were not operated for profit. 6 It also
extended the Act's jurisdiction to a profit-making radio station operated by a nonprofit educational organization.4" Furthermore, in its
1950 decision in General Electric Co.,48 the Board asserted jurisdic-

tion over a hospital because it was an adjunct established by a commercial employer for the use and benefit of its employees. The real
significance of the decision, however, was its reference to the Conference Committee Report-which had indicated that the Board viewed
44. 73 N.L.R.B. 1254 (1947).
45. See notes 27, 30 supra and accompanying text.

46. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 81 N.L.R.B. 201 (1949). The Board relied on the fact that
the sponsored research projects were of a commercial nature, education being of secondary
significance. Id. at 202.
47. Port Arthur College, 92 N.L.R.B. 152 (1950).
48. 89 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1950).
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nonprofit organizations generally as not affecting commerce and,
therefore, as not being jurisdictional-as being a "fair statement of
the Board's policy under the Wagner Act."49 This seemingly innocu-

ous adoption of a congressional misstatement of the Board's policy
was the beginning of a shift in policy toward nonprofit employers

which was to prevail for nearly twenty years. 0
A general "worthy cause" exemption, based upon an examination

of employer motives instead of activities, was developed by the Board
in Trustees of Columbia University5 in 1951. In declining to assert

jurisdiction over Columbia University, the Board dismissed a petition
for a proposed bargaining unit of library clerical employees, notwithstanding clear evidence that the university fell within prevailing

dollar-amount yardsticks for NLRA jurisdiction.52 Instead, the
Board reasoned that assertion of "jurisdiction over a nonprofit, educational institution where the activities involved are noncommercial
in nature and intimately connected with the charitable purposes and
educational activities of the institution" would not effectuate the policy of the Act-the elimination of obstructions to the free flow of

commerce.5 3 In reaching its conclusion, the Board purported to dis-

tinguish previous nonprofit employer cases and recognized the Con-

ference Report as a "guide" from Congress.5 4 For nearly two decades

the Board followed this basic policy of examining the purposes of
nonprofit employers rather than their impact on commerce. 5 Thus,

if the employer was a nonprofit organization, the mere fact that its
activities had a substantial impact on interstate commerce would no
49. Id. at 1249 n.4 (dictum). See note 27 supra and accompanying text. For another case
in which the Board asserted jurisdiction over a nonprofit operation created by a commercial
employer for its employees, see Olin Indus., Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 130 (1951).
50. In Sunday School Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, 92 N.L.R.B. 801 (1950), decided
later the same year, the Board split in taking jurisdiction over a nonprofit employer providing
advice and literature to Sunday schools. The dissent would have relied on the Conference
Committee Report's statement of the Board's policy. Id. at 805.
W 51. 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
52. For an extensive listing of the then current jurisdictional yardsticks as they applied to
Columbia, see id. at 425 n.2.
53. Id. at 427. The policy of the NLRA is found in § 1 of the Act:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce. . . by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining ....29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
54. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 427 (1951).
55. See, e.g., California State Auto Ass'n, 170 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1968); Y.M.C.A. of
Portland, 146 N.L.R.B. 20 (1964); Sheltered Workshops, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 961 (1960). Cf
Local 33, Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders, 153 N.L.R.B. 392 (1965).
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longer be a sufficient basis for NLRB jurisdiction."
SINCE COLUMBIA:

UNIVERSITIES, HOSPITALS, AND THE DEVELOPING

CONCEPT OF "ANCILLARY

RELATIONSHIP"

Duke University was the first NLRB decision to consider the
effect of the interaction between a university and a hospital. The case
can best be understood after analysis of previous cases involving
educational institutions and hospitals separately, and other cases reflecting the interaction of some related, ancillary activity with a university or hospital. Such an analysis will suggest some general conclusions as to the jurisdictional effect of an "ancillary relationship"
between two employers who have otherwise different jurisdictional
status-a relationship created wherein the activities of one employer
are intimately connected with, and ancillary to, those of the other
employer. With these goals in mind, the remainder of this Note will
be devoted to a review of previous Board cases involving universities
and hospitals, a discussion of the probable meaning of the language
of the nonprofit hospital exemption itself, and, finally, a consideration of these Board precedents in relation to the Duke University
decision.
The impact of the Columbia decision was so pronounced that no
significant similar case came before the Board for over a decade.
Finally, in the middle 1960's, three cases were decided involving nonprofit university operations.5 In each case the standard of Columbia
was applied and the nonprofit educational motives of the university
were held to overshadow the impact of the university on interstate
commerce. Nevertheless, in 1970 the Board in Cornell University58
effected a profound reversal of the Columbia doctrine. 9 In Cornell,
the Board decided that it would better effectuate the purposes of the
56. See Disabled Am. Veterans, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 864, 866 (1955), in which an exception
was made, however, where the type of activity (manufacture of automobile license identification
tags) was characteristic of a "highly developed commercial enterprise."
57. Univ. of Miami, 146 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1964) (non-teaching unit of employees engaged
in research at special laboratories in an institute located at the university); Massachusetts Inst.
of Technology, 152 N.L.R.B. 598 (1965) (university computation center employees); Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ., 152 N.L.R.B. 704 (1965) (non-teaching employees in a laboratory housing
a linear accelerator). See also Lovelace Foundation for Medical Educ. & Research, 164
N.L.R.B. 743 (1967). But cf Wood's Hole Oceanographic Inst., 143 N.L.R.B. 568 (1963)
(jurisdiction asserted where research was found to benefit private industry).
58. 183 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970).
59. For a discussion of Cornell, see 32 U. Pir. L. REv. 416 (1971) and 44 TEp. L.Q.
410 (1971).
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Act by asserting jurisdiction over two universities-Cornell and Syracuse-whose operations it felt had a substantial impact on commerce.
This admittedly complete reversal of policy was based on a recognition that despite their nonprofit status and educational purposes,
many universities constitute a sufficient part of interstate commerce
to pose a threat of obstruction to the free flow of commerce, a threat
which the Act seeks to eliminate. A jurisdictional yardstick of gross
annual university revenue (excluding restricted contributions not usable for general expenses) was soon thereafter established at one million dollars. 0 In the short time since Cornell was decided, petitions
for bargaining units at nonprofit schools and universities have been
numerous.6 When faced with the Duke University factual setting,
therefore, the Board had ample precedent for finding jurisdiction over
Duke University itself.
The viability of the Board's use of the "ancillary relationship"
concept in affecting the jurisdictional status of employers in the university setting is demonstrated by cases involving profit-making employers who provide food services to universities. 2 In pre-Cornell
decisions involving food services, the Board determined such employers to be outside the jurisdiction of the NLRA.6 3 In each instance
the Board cited as controlling factors the non-commercial nature of
the service and its intimate relationship with the nonprofit educational purposes of the university. However, in the first similar case
to reach the Board after the Cornell decision had applied the Act to
universities, jurisdiction was asserted over the "ancillary-service"
employer. 4 The opinion simply recited that the exemption for universities no longer existed and that the employer's gross sales revenue
satisfied the Board's dollar-amount guidelines for NLRA jurisdiction. The impact on Duke University of these cases involving ancillary services to universities is limited, however, in that no case in60. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1971), reprinted in 186 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 75 L.R.R.M. 1442

(1970).
61. See, e.g., Corcoran Gallery of Art, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 75 L.R.R.M. 1380 (1970);
Boston College, 187 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 75 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1970).
62. For cases involving employers rendering services to hospitals, see notes 72-78 infra and
accompanying text.
63. The Prophet Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1559 (1965); Crotty Bros., 146 N.L.R.B. 755 (1964);
Saga Food Serv., Case No. 7-RC-9804, 73 L.R.R.M. 1479 (1970); Saga Food Serv., Case No.
9-RC-6112, 1965 CCH NLRB REP.
9,222 (1965). See also Iowa State Memorial Union, 55
L.R.R.M. 1362 (1964) (NLRB Admin. Dec.).
64. I.T.T. Canteen Corp., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 75 L.R.R.M. 1496 (1970).
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volved an ancillary organization which was nonprofit in purpose.
They do indicate, nonetheless, that when the "ancillary relationship"
concept is applied to universities, the current controlling factor is
.whether the university is considered to be in interstate commerce and,
therefore, within NLRA jurisdiction.
In considering the independent jurisdictional status of hospitals,
the Board in 1960 announced in Flatbush General Hospita15 that it
would not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction over
proprietary, profit-making hospitals, even though they had a sufficient inflow of goods to have an impact on commerce as measured
by current jurisdictional standards. The Board gave two reasons for
the decision-that such hospitals serve primarily local residents, and
that they are subject to close regulation by states, including regulation in the field of labor relations since the 1959 amendments to the
Act. 6 In 1967, the Board abandoned this rationale and overruled
67 The emphasis in Flatbush on
Flatbush in Butte Medical Properties.
the local nature of proprietary hospital activity was disposed of by
noting that many hospital doctors and nurses are imported from outof-state and that proprietary hospitals have a substantial impact on
commerce in the aggregate. Further, the Board noted that state regulation of hospitals emphasized inspection and licensing with little
attention given to labor relations. A gross revenue standard for
NLRA jurisdiction was set at $250,000. With this yardstick, the
Board has since asserted jurisdiction regularly in cases involving proprietary hospitals and clinics.68 In one of these cases, Mayo Clinic, 9
the Board met and disposed of the pre-Cornell question of whether
the employer was primarily engaged in education and research. The
latter activities were found to be incidental to the primary purpose
of the clinic-the practice of medicine-and insufficient, therefore, to
65. 126 N.L.R.B. 144 (1970).

66. Section 14(c)(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1970), provides that the states
may assert jurisdiction "over labor disputes which the Board declines" pursuant to its established jurisdictional yardsticks. Later the same year the fact that the Board had assumed

jurisdiction over several disputes involving proprietary hospitals prior to 1959 was held not to
have created a prevailing standard within the meaning of section 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(l)

(1970), which holds the Board to "standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959." Leedom v. Fitch
Sanitarium, Inc., 294 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Cf Council 19, American Fed'n of State
Employees v. NLRB, 296 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
67. 168 N.L.R.B. 266 (1967).
68. E.g., Centerville Clinics, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 73 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1970); Quain
& Ramstad Clinic, 173 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1968); Mayo Clinic, 168 N.L.R.B. 557 (1967).
69. 168 N.L.R.B. 557 (1967).
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bar the assertion of NLRA jurisdiction. 0

In addition to its ability to effect changes in the jurisdictional
status of "ancillary" employers operating within the university set-

ting,7' the "ancillary relationship" concept has had a marked impact

on the assertion of Board jurisdiction over employers whose activities

are interwoven with the operations of hospitals. While there seems
to be no difficulty in asserting jurisdiction over those employers furnishing services to proprietary hospitals, a division appears when the

services are being rendered to an exempt nonprofit hospital. The
cases seem to turn on how intimately the services in question are

interwoven with the hospital itself; however, it is often difficult to
reconcile the decisions. In cases involving a blood bank, 72 an em-

ployer providing hospital laundry services,73 and an employer providing food services 7 4 to exempt nonprofit hospitals, the Board de-

clined jurisdiction because of the intimate connection of the employers with the operations of the exempt hospitals. In each of these cases
the ancillary "employer" was a corporate entity separate from the
5
hospital itself. On the other hand, employers providing ambulance

70. The Act has been extended to nursing homes regardless of whether or not they are
operated for profit. Decided with Butte MedicalPropertieswas University Nursing Home, Inc.,
168 N.L.R.B. 263 (1967), in which the Board applied the same principles to open the door to
jurisdiction over nursing homes having gross annual revenues in excess of $100,000. Since
University Nursing the Board has heard and decided to take jurisdiction in many cases involving nursing homes. See, e.g., Visiting Nurses Ass'n, 187 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 76 L.R.R.M. 1096
(1971); Martin Luther Foundation, Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 75 L.R.R.M. 1282 (1970);
Rosewood, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 87,75 L.R.R.M. 1101 (1970); Good Samaritan Hosp., 185
N.L.R.B. No. 86, 75 L.R.R.M. 1103 (1970); Bethany Home for the Aged, 185 N.L.R.B. No.
85, 75 L.R.R.M. 1099 (1970); Drexel Home, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 74 L.R.R.M. 1232
(1970); 2520 Madison Corp. (Lillian Abrahamson Nursing Home), 174 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 70
L.R.R.M. 1285 (1969); Mar Salle, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 429 (1968); Lakeland Convalescent
Center, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 97 (1968); Somerset Manor, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 1647 (1968); Birch
Haven Nursing Home, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 414 (1968). In the sole case in which jurisdiction
was declined, one involving a nonprofit home, the Board was reversed for abuse of discretion.
Council 19, American Fed'n of State Employees v. NLRB, 296 F. Supp. 1100, 1104-05 (N.D.
III. 1968).
71. For cases involving employers rendering services to educational institutions, see notes
63, 64 supra and accompanying text.
72. Inter-County Blood Banks, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 252 (1967) (reversing the Regional
Director's decision in Case No. 29-RC-574, 63 L.R.R.M. 1404 (1966)).
73. United Hosp. Servs., Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 168, 69 L.R.R.M. 1046 (1968).
74. Horn & Hardart Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1368, 1370 (1965), where the Board declined to
assert jurisdiction because "the food service operations performed by the employer under its
contract with the Hospital [were] incidental to and intimately connected with the patient care
and medical education purposes of the Hospital."
75. Bob's Ambulance Serv., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 71 L.R.R.M. 1587 (1969).
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and warehousing76 service to exempt hospitals were found to be within
the Board's jurisdiction. It is easy to accept this result since neither
of these latter services involves in-hospital patient care nor is an
activity which a hospital customarily performs for itself. The most
difficult cases to reconcile are decisions in which the Board has asserted jurisdiction over employers providing housekeeping 7 and
cleaning and maintenance services.78 These services are related to
patient care and are traditionally performed by hospitals themselves,
yet the Board takes jurisdiction while declining the same in the case
of laundry services. Consequently, whenever there exists an ancillary
relationship in which an exempt hospital occupies the role of dominant employer, the only confident position which can be taken with
regard to the net jurisdictional effect of the relationship is that in
some cases the coverage of the Act will be denied to ancillary employers who are otherwise jurisdictional.
Closer to the factual setting in Duke University are cases in which
nonprofit hospitals, arguably excluded by section 2(2), have assumed
an ancillary role in relation to profit-making employers engaged in
interstate commerce and have consistently been brought within the
Act's coverage. Jurisdiction has thus been asserted over hospitals
established to serve employees of commercial businesses such as mining,79 manufacturing,80 and a hospital associated with a profit-making
clinic pharmacy." In another case, jurisdiction was asserted where a
hospital was found to affect the national defense.8" The significance
of employer activity interrelationship was similarly demonstrated in
a recent case where two "convalescent units" to which the Act would
normally apply were left without its protection because they were
found to be too closely associated with a statutorily excluded hospital.? All of the 'above cases where NLRA jurisdiction was asserted
possess one common feature: the dominating employer in the "ancillary relationship" was a profit-making operation. If Duke University
76. Southern Permanente Serv., Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 68 L.R.R.M. 1504 (1968).
77. Richmond of New Jersey, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 820 (1967).
78. Bay Ran Maintenance Corp., 161 N.L.R.B. 820 (1966). See Chimney & Furnace
Vacuum Cleaning Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 994 (1968).

79. Miami Inspiration Hosp., Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 636 (1969); Kennecott Copper Corp., 99
N.L.R.B. 748 (1952).
80. General Elec. Co. (Kadlec Hosp.), 89 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1950).
81. Parkvue Medical Center, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 74 L.R.R.M. 1689 (1970).
82. Hospital Hato Tejas, Inc., I ll N.L.R.B. 155 (1955).
83. Sierra Hosp. Foundation, 181 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 73 L.R.R.M. 1541 (1970). See also
Wesleyan Foundation, 171 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 68 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1968).
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were a profit-making enterprise, therefore, a strong line of precedents
would suggest NLRA coverage of the hospital. Exclusion of Duke

Hospital from the Act's jurisdiction in the Duke University decision,
however, indicates a choice by the Board not to extend the "ancillary
relationship" concept to assert jurisdiction over hospitals dominated
by nonprofit employers, despite the fact that the Board has extended

its jurisdictional arm to hospitals connected with dominant profitmaking employers, and even though both types of employers have
been found to be engaged in interstate commerce and independently

subject to the Act's jurisdiction.
THE MEANING OF THE HOSPITAL EXEMPTION AND ITS APPLICATION
TO DUKE HOSPITAL

The nonprofit hospital exemption is conspicuously absent from

the definition of "employer" in the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, s8 the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclo-

sure Act,85 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 and the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938,87 in which hospital employers em-

ployed by a state or its subdivision are specifically included. In fact,
the Taft-Hartley amendment is the sole piece of federal labor legisla-

tion to exempt nonprofit hospitals from its coverage. The National
Labor Relations Act regulates relationships between "employers"
and "employees"; "employee" is defined to exclude persons who do

not work for an "employer."88 Thus, the source for exclusion of
certain hospitals and their employees is the following language of the

Taft-Hartley amendment:
any corporation or associaThe term "employer" . . . shall not include .
tion operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of

84. 29 U.S.C. § 402 (1970).
85. Id. § 301.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
87. Fair Labor Standards Act § 3(d)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)(1) (1970), amending 29
U.S.C. § 203(d) (1964). The Act was amended in 1966 to extend minimum wage coverage to
nonprofessional employees at state schools and hospitals. The constitutionality of the amendment was upheld in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193-99 (1968):
We think the District Court was correct in declining to decide in the abstract and in
general, whether schools and hospitals have employees engaged in commerce or production. Such institutions, as a whole, obviously purchase a vast range of out-of-state
commodities. These are put to a wide variety of uses, presumably ranging from physical
incorporation of building materials into hospital and school structures, to over-thecounter sale for cash to patients, visitors, students, and teachers. Id. at 201.
88. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
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"

Even after twenty-five years, the exact meaning of this language
remains something of a mystery. The Board itself has admitted that
it is "difficult to define" what is or is not an exempt hospital." From
the quoted language it can be seen that three questions must be
answered affirmatively in determining whether the exemption applies: (1) whether the facility is a "hospital"; (2) whether the organization operating the facility is devoid of private shareholders and
individual owners; and (3) whether no part of the net earnings inures
to the benefit of such shareholders or individuals.
Most basic of the three questions is whether or not the facility
being operated is a "hospital." Although neither the statute nor a
single Board decision offers an express definition, the meaning of the
term can be divined from several Board decisions. One consideration
frequently employed is whether the facility is classified as a "hospital" by its license, organizational accreditation, articles of incorporation, or charter." In addition, something more than beds and nursing
care is required in order to qualify for exempt status.92 Furthermore,
the hospital exemption has been denied to a "sub-acute" facility,
which provided services ranging from intensive care to custodial nursing services but lacked a permanent staff of doctors," and to a
facility offering extended care. 4 Since the Board has provided only
hints of the exemption's scope instead of an express definition, the
suggestion arises that the Board assumes that the congressional
meaning is so obvious that it deserves no in-depth discussion. Nevertheless, the Board's decisions seem to indicate that in order to qualify
as an exempt hospital, the facility must provide a wide range of
facilities and services for the treatment of the ill, including inpatient
care, a staff of doctors, laboratory facilities, and other "acute" services. By attaining these earmarks, in addition to licensing by state law
and accreditation from a hospital association, qualification for the
exemption is possible.
89. Id. § 152(2).
90. Children's Village, Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 137,75 L.R.R.M. 1476 (1970). In an earlier
case involving the same employer, the Board had declined to give an advisory opinion as to
the exempt status of the institution. 180 N.L.R.B. No. 169, 73 L.R.R.M. 1250 (1970).
91. Rosewood, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 75 L.R.R.M. 1101 (1970).
92. See Good Samaritan Hosp., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 75 L.R.R.M. 1103 (1970) (NLRA
jurisdiction asserted over 215-bed nursing home); Bethany Home for the Aged, 185 N.L.R.B.
No. 85, 75 L.R.R.M. 1099 (1970) (NLRA jurisdiction asserted over 212-bed nursing home).
93. Martin Luther Foundation, Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 75 L.R.R.M. 1282 (1970).
94. Rosewood, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 87,75 L.R.R.M. 1101 (1970).
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Even if the facility qualifies as a "hospital" by virtue of its activities, the applicability of the nonprofit hospital exemption depends,
secondly, on whether or not the corporation or association which
operates the facility is devoid of private shareholders. Again, the
Board has shunned detail when discussing ownership of hospitals.
Whether or not the entity operating the hospital is organized under
state law as a corporation, nonprofit or otherwise, has had a substantial effect on the determination of this ownership issue. Although
other organizational forms may also be found to include individuals
standing in the place of shareholders, the Board's usual approach has
been a conclusionary one as to the presence or absence of proprietary
features.95
Even if the organization operating the hospital is found to have
private shareholders, the nonprofit hospital exemption will apply if
"no part of the net earnings inures" to their benefit.96 It is not clear
whether this language means that earnings must actually be distributed to the owners, or whether it is sufficient for jurisdictional purposes that the organization is set up such that if earnings were distributed, a part of them would have to go to shareholders. It is equally
unclear whether the earnings in question must be those of the hospital
alone, or the earnings of the operating "corporation or association,"
which may also have other activities. Neither of the above questions
has been answered directly; however, as long as the corporation is
structured to give shareholders the potential to share the earnings
from any aspect of its business, the exemption would probably not
apply.
By these standards, Duke Hospital, taken as an isolated entity, is
a clear example of that class of institutions which the Act requires
to be exempt from its coverage. It provides the "acute" care over a
wide range which separates it from mere convalescent homes. Its
earnings, if any, inure to the benefit of no shareholder or individual.
Indeed, there are no shareholders of the nonprofit corporation creating Duke University, from which Duke Hospital has no separate legal
existence.97 Thus, notwithstanding the Board's prior failure to articu95. For cases involving the presence of proprietary organizations, see, e.g., Butte Medical
Properties, 168 N.L.R.B. 266 (1967); University Nursing Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 263 (1967);
Flatbush General Hosp., 126 N.L.R.B. 144, 45 L.R.R.M. 1286 (1960). For nonprofit institutions, see, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 75 L.R.R.M. 1103 (1970).
96. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
97. Duke Univ., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 78 L.R.R.M. 1547, 1549 (1971). Duke University
is organized under the Non-Profit Corporation Act of North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 55A-1 to -89.1 (Supp. 1971).
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late exact standards, it is not surprising that Duke Hospital was
found within that class of institutions at which the exemption is
aimed. Without looking further, that fact should clearly dictate
against the Board's assertion ofjurisdiction over a university hospital
such as Duke Hospital.
Once the nonprofit hospital exemption is found, however, a fourth
inquiry is necessary to determine its scope-whether the exclusion
applies to the association or corporation operating the hospital, or to
the hospital itself. It seems clear from the relevant text of the exemption 8 that it does apply, at least on its face, to the operating corporation or association. Carrying that construction to its logical conclusion, however, would result in many exclusions from coverage of
operations much larger than the hospital. Consequently, the Board
in Duke University continued its practice of limiting the scope of the
exemption to the hospital entity itself once it has found the exemption
applicable.
The narrow scope given the nonprofit hospital exemption by the
Board is consistent with the Board's policy of reading broadly the
jurisdictional language of the NLRA, while construing exemptions
narrowly. The Board has, for example, asserted jurisdiction over
what it considered to be an exempt nonprofit hospital on the theory
that the hospital was a "person engaged in commerce" within the
meaning of the secondary boycott provision of section 8(b)(4).Y1 Furthermore, in several cases the relationship of an otherwise jurisdictional operation to an otherwise exempt operation has been used as
a means for asserting or declining jurisdiction jointly over both enterprises.' "' In each case, the basis for the decision has been whether or
not the policies of the Act would be effectuated. Adherence to these
policies creates a propensity in the Board to become involved in a
broadening range of circumstances, producing unpredictable results.
THE ANCILLARY RELATIONSHIP AND PROPER-EMPLOYER ISSUES:

Two

RECENT DECISIONS

Any attempt to apply the section 2(2) exemption in a setting such

98. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
99. Local 3, IBEW, 128 N.L.R.B. 566 (1960). See also Local 2669, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 173 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1968). Cf. NLRB Gen. Counsel Admin. Ruling No. SR1629, 49 L.R.R.M. 1306 (1961). Prior to 1959, the Board applied the same jurisdictional
standards in all unfair labor practice cases and representation proceedings. San Diego Bldg.

Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 28 n.4 (1957); see C.A. Braukman, 94 N.L.R.B. 1609
(1951).
100. See notes 72-78 supra and accompanying text.
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as Duke University must face the concept of "ancillary relationship"
and the need for ascertaining the proper jurisdictional employer. Two
recent decisions, involving nonprofit hospitals that were related to the
operations of other employers, have a significant bearing on these
concepts and, consequently, on how Duke might have been decided.
In Sierra Hospital Foundation'0 1 jurisdiction was declined over a

hospital and two "sub-acute" 10 2 convalescent units. In a firm application of the ancillary relationship concept, the Board concluded that
the convalescent units, offering a total of 99 beds, were so closely
related to the exempt hospital as to be inseparable for purposes of
NLRA jurisdiction. In reaching this result, the Board found that the
entire operation was conducted, both administratively and functionally, as a single entity, all three facilities being governed by one set
of bylaws and administered by one board of trustees. A second basis
for the decision was the fact that the hospital services rendered in -the
two convalescent units were "closely and intimately related to, and
in some situations

. . .

inseparable from, the hospital services."' 3

Less than three months later, the Board in Parkvue Medical
Center'0 4 asserted jurisdiction over an otherwise exempt hospital
which was operated in conjunction with a profit-making medical center and pharmacy. The hospital's charter contained a provision, present since its incorporation in 1959 under the nonprofit corporation
laws of Michigan, providing that no part of its net earnings could
inure to the benefit of any person, and that upon dissolution, its
trustees must distribute its assets to another nonprofit institution of
like character. Notwithstanding its nonprofit purpose, the hospital
was located in a building which also accommodated Parkvue Medical
Center and the Parkvue Pharmacy, both profit-making enterprises.
The building proprietors owned the entire medical center, possessed
a one-half interest in the pharmacy, and served as trustees and directors of the hospital. In determining that all of these operations were
"interrelated parts of an integrated operation" and, therefore, constituted a single employer, the Board found that the hospital "[had] no
true viability apart from the Center upon which it must rely for its
complete and effective operation" and that the three together were
101. 181 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 73 L.R.R.M. 1541 (1970).
102. See Martin Luther Foundation, Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 16,75 L.R.R.M. 1282 (1970);
note 93 supra and accompanying text.
103. Sierra Hosp. Foundation, 181 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 73 L.R.R.M. 1541 (1970).
104. 183 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 74 L.R.R.M. 1689 (1970).
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"operated primarily for business purposes."'' 5 The Board concluded
that the limitations of the section 2(2) exemption had been exceeded,
citing General Electric Co.,"0 6 Kennecott Copper,'"7 and Miami Inspiration Hospital.'8
While neither Sierra nor Parkvue is dispositive of the legal issues
presented in Duke University, both cases are instructive for understanding the Board's approach in the Duke decision. Of the two cases,
Parkvue is more similar to the Duke setting and would appear to
present a controlling analogy were it not for the finding that the
Parkvue Hospital relied completely on two profit-making enterprises
for its existence in a structurally combined operation. Duke Hospital
is very likely capable of a viable existence apart from the University
itself, and this fact ostensibly provides a potential basis of distinction
between the Duke University and Parkvue cases. Yet the degree of
integration of Duke Hospital with the non-exempt educational facility-Duke University-is sufficient to support a finding that it has
no separable existence. Its doctors and paramedical staff are, in many
instances, concurrently involved in routine patient care, medical research and medical education, the last two being proper functions of
a university. To separate the latter functions and associated personnel
from the hospital proper would likely cause serious damage to its role
as a hospital.
A second potential basis of distinction between the Duke
University and Parkvue cases lies in the fact that in viewing the
university and hospital in Duke University as an integrated operation, the overall purpose emerges as educational and nonprofit, as
opposed to the business-for-profit purpose of the integrated network
in Parkvue. This basis for distinction, however, is diminished by the
fact that the Board has practically abandoned its commerciality'l
and employer purpose"0 tests, and it is difficult to understand why
they were apparently raised again in Parkvue. Furthermore, an additional factor which could have been used to bring the factual setting
in Duke University even closer to that found in Parkvue-the existence of a large Private Diagnostic Clinic serving outpatients forprofit
in the main hospital building-was not even mentioned in the Duke
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id., 74 L.R.R.M. at 1692.
89 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1950).
99 N.L.R.B. 748 (1952).
175 N.L.R.B. 636 (1969).
See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text.
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opinion. As a result, although Parkvue can be distinguished from
Duke on the ground that Parkvue Hospital was operating in conjunction with a jurisdictional, profit-making enterprise whereas Duke
Hospital was operating as a part of a jurisdictional, nonprofit educational institution, this basis for distinction would disappear if
Parkvue could be read broadly to hold that a nonprofit hospital
operated as an inseparable part of any jurisdictional employer will
not be exempted from the Act.
Duke University evolved in the wake of these two decisions and
in the historical setting which has been detailed in the preceding
sections. It provided the opportunity for clarification of the proper
employer and ancillary relationship issues which will arise inevitably
in the setting of an otherwise exempt nonprofit hospital attached to
a jurisdictional nonprofit university. Yet what the Board chose to do
with the opportunity is far from satisfying.
THE DECISION IN

Duke University

The possibility that the Board might not assert jurisdiction over
Duke Hospital was not considered until late in the representation
hearing, and even then it was raised only by the hearing officer.'
Unlike the employer in Mayo Clinic,"2 where the parties urged the
Board to assert jurisdiction (which it did without attempting to deal
with the section 2(2) problem), the employer in Duke University took
no position as to whether the hospital was covered by the NLRA.
Local 1199D sought to avoid the problem entirely by arguing that
there was only one applicable employer, Duke University, a position
which found considerable support in the Board's dissenting opinion.
In support of this position, the petitioning union emphasized several
aspects of Duke University's organization and purpose which it felt
should be decisive. First, the University, including the hospital, medical center, and medical school, was run by one Board of Directors
through an interlocking hierarchy of department heads. Furthermore,
although the hospital" 3 was budgeted as a self-supporting operation,
operating deficits had been absorbed by the University's general
fund."' Finally, all hospital wages and salaries were paid by the
Ill. At the representation hearing, the parties stipulated that the University as a whole was
an employer within the meaning of the Act.
112. 168 N.L.R.B. 557 (1967); see note 69 supra and accompanying text.
113. Three hospitals, including those at Sea Level and Highlands, North Carolina, are
involved in the unit determination.
114. This fact was omitted from the discussion in the majority opinion in Duke University.
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university, as were other expenditures for the hospital, based on annual budgets. In short, it was urged by the petitioner that the type of
university-hospital involved here was sui generis in nature and should
be treated as a university, not as a university and a hospital."'
The majority in Duke University, in its short consideration of the
jurisdictional question, began its reasoning with the assumption that
the exemption of section 2(2) applies to "hospitals operated by corporations or associations""' not for profit, thereby deciding without
comment that hospitals themselves rather than the organizations operating the hospitals are excluded. Thus, Duke Hospital was found
to be within the literal meaning of the exemption. Next, the Board
practically ignored the ancillary relationship problem by simply concluding that the section 2(2) exclusion related to hospital functions,
and thus the Board was "prohibited by the statute from asserting
jurisdiction over the hospital functions of Duke University."", No
attempt was made to ascertain the true meaning of the exemption,
assuming one can ever be determined; nor were prior Board decisions
discussed." 8
Dissenting Board Member Fanning, on the other hand, relied on
the proposition that there was only one employer-the university-and concluded that all Duke University employees, including
its hospital employees, were within NLRA jurisdiction. In reaching
this conclusion, the dissenting Board member applied to this overall
university employer the language of section 2(2) as enlightened by its
meager legislative history. His reasoning was that either (I) Duke
University, the employer, operated a university and incidentally a
hospital-in which case it is an employer within the meaning of the
Act and all its employees were covered; or (2) because it operated a
nonprofit hospital, it was not an employer at all within the meaning
115. Nor was the position of Local 1199D, that the hospital service employees in the

Hospital and Medical Center constituted an appropriate bargaining unit, inconsistent with its
jurisdictional theory, since section 9(b) of the Act commands that for a given employer the
Board shall decide which unit assures employees the fullest freedom for exercising their guaranteed rights. NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
116. 194 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 78 L.R.R.M. 1547, 1549 (1971).
117. Id.
118. The Board also mentioned Loyola Univ., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 78 L.R.R.M. 1551

(1971) (which cited without discussion Sierra Hosp. Foundation, 181 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 73
L.R.R.M. 1541 (1970); The Wesleyan Foundation, 171 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 68 L.R.R.M. 1035
(1968); Lovelace Foundation for Medical Educ. and Research, 165 N.L.R.B. 743 (1967); and
United Hosp. Servs., Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 188, 69 L.R.R.M. 1046 (1968)). 194 N.L.R.B.
No. 31, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1549.
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of the Act and none of its employees were covered. To support his
conclusion that all Duke employees must be covered, he noted from
the legislative history that Duke Hospital did not fit the class of
struggling, nonprofit hospitals which he felt Congress intended to
protect by the exemption." 9
The flaw in the logic of the dissenting opinion lies in its premise
that there could be only one employer-the university-to which the
jurisdictional language of the statute would apply. Not a single case20
was, or can be, cited in direct support of the dissenting position.1
On the other hand, several Board decisions dealing with potentially
exempt hospitals have openly discarded reliance on corporate structure and have examined instead the relationships between, and integration of, functionally 21
distinct units that are controlled by the same
corporate "employer."1
Neither the majority nor dissenting approach is intellectually or
historically satisfying. The majority clearly departs from the literal
language of the exemption. The dissenter relies too heavily on an
attenuated meaning of legislative history, which, if it would have any
effect on the construction of the exemption, weighs more against his
position than in favor of it. The most logical approch would have
been to begin with the assumption that the exemption was aimed at
the hospital itself. A reasonable explanation, perhaps one which even
Member Fanning could accept, would seem to be that the sparse
legislative history of the exemption indicates that it was intended to
benefit hospitals only-not the larger operating organizations. The
terms "corporation or association" were undoubtedly inserted to accomodate the exemption's application to a business entity, since
"hospital" alone might mean only the physical facility itself, devoid
of power to employ workers.
A major shortcoming of the Duke University decision was the
Board's failure to confront the question of the jurisdictional effect of
the ancillary relationship between an appurtenant hospital and its
dominant employer, a university. The relationship of an exempt hospital to an employer over which the Board asserts jurisdiction has
119. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
120. Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 81 (1958), was cited in this vein, but it merely
stands for the proposition that once part of an employer's operation is found to satisfy jurisdictional standards (dollar amount), the entire operation is covered.
121. See, e.g., Parkvue Medical Center, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 74 L.R.R.M. 1689 (1970);
Miami Inspiration Hosp., Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 636 (1969).
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never been without significance. It is in this context that the importance of Duke is highlighted. While in Parkvue the Board took jurisdiction over a nonprofit hospital closely related to a profit-making
employer, Duke is the first case to consider the effect of a relationship
between a nonprofit hospital and a nonprofit employer over which
jurisdiction is routinely asserted. The Board could have justified
going either way with a full explanation of its theory. It could have
logically reached its decision to dismiss the petition by distinguishing
Parkvue and giving controlling weight to the overall nonprofit status
of the university. On the other hand, inasmuch as the hospital is
closely connected with a non-exempt employer which affects interstate commerce, there is logic also in the conclusion of the dissent-to
assert jurisdiction over all Duke University employees, including hospital workers, as being subject to one overall employer, the university.
The ultimate decision requiring exemption for Duke Hospital is not
nearly as questionable as the Board's failure to articulate the reason
for it.122 The end result of the Duke University decision, nevertheless,
is an implication that a nonprofit hospital operated by a jurisdictional
nonprofit employer is exempted from the coverage of the Act. In its
more narrow scope, Duke University holds that the above rule applies
with certainty to the university-hospital complex. In the absence of
needed clarification, other situations, unfortunately, must remain
uncertain.
CONCLUSION

In light of the Board's current policy of extending the Act's coverage to employers engaged in commerce, irrespective of their motives-charitable, educational or otherwise-it is appropriate to reexamine the need for the exemption of hospitals.'2 At the time the
exemption was added, it was generally assumed by the sponsors of
the bill that the Board would adhere to a discretionary policy of
granting exemptions to nonprofit charitable organizations. 24 The
only likely explanation for the insertion of a hospital exemption is
122. The formula chosen for deciding which employees would not be part of the university

unit was based on the percentage of time an employee normally spent in the hospital. Employees who spent more than 50% of their working time in the hospital were considered employees
of the hospital and thus not covered by the Act. 78 L.R.R.M. at 1549.

123. See generally Kochery & Strauss; Sherman & Black.
124. See notes 30, 45 supra and accompanying text.
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that the American Hospital Association lobbied effectively.' m Senator Taft even said that his committee felt it was unnecessary to exempt hospitals specifically, indicating that the need to exempt them
was no greater than for any other nonprofit employer. 26 Thus, when
today's Board routinely ignores the nonprofit status of employers and
their motives and looks to their impact on commerce, 2 7 it is anomalous that hospitals should still be exempt.
None of the reasons which have been advanced from time to time
in support of the exemption seem to hold continuing validity, assuming they were ever valid. Most states have not filled the gap by taking
jurisdiction over the labor relations problems of charitable hospitals. 2 1 Many hospitals easily meet the standards currently set by the
Board for determining whether an employer affects interstate commerce. Finally, the argument that hospitals should remain exempt to
preserve industrial peace is at best questionable. If the Act achieves
its stated purposes-promotion of commercial and industrial stability-hospitals would fare better if made subject to the Board's juris2
diction. 1
Furthermore, there are several affirmative reasons why the Act
should cover nonprofit hospitals which affect commerce. First, it does
not seem equitable to force hospital employees to bear the burden of
supporting the charitable purposes of the instituions for which they
work by accepting a lower standard of living.'"" Such employees need
the ability to bargain for fair wages and desired working conditions
as much as any other category of workers. Furthermore, a possible
equal protection argument arises on the basis that most nonprofessional hospital service employees are financially poor.", To
systematically exclude hospitals from the coverage of the Act is,
theoretically, to discriminate against hospital employees as a class,
since by far the greatest impact of the exemption falls on them.
The National Labor Relations Board, however, may not extend
the coverage of the Act to specifically excluded employers for the
125. See notes 21, 24 supra and accompanying text.
126. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., St. Vincent's Nursing Home v. Dep't of Labor, 169 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.
1969). But see New York Infirmary, 27 N.Y. S.L.R.B. No. 14, 55 L.R.R.M. 1294 (1964).
129. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); note 53 supra and accompanying text.
130. See Kochery & Strauss 277; Sherman & Black 1349.
13 1. See generally Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969).
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mere purpose of advancing social policy. That is the function of
Congress. Whatever the perceived strength of a policy, it must give
way when it collides with an unambiguous and specific statutory
prohibition. Whether the hospital exemption is so clear and
unambiguous as to preclude the possibility of the Board's assertion
of jurisdiction over a hospital integrated into a jurisdictional university complex is a question which has now been answered affirmatively
by the Board in Duke University. The question of whether the Board
will afford the exemption identical treatment in the setting of a nonprofit employer which is not a university remains to be answered.

